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Priority No. 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
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following controlling constitutional and statutory provisions: 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Ewell's jury conviction should be reversed because the 
trial court conducted an inadequate voir dire and erred in denying 
the motion for a mistrial made by counsel for Mr. Ewell upon 
counsel's discovery that one of the jurors on Mr. Ewell's jury had 
failed to disclose during Mr. Ewell's voir dire a bias against 
non-testifying defendants which he had disclosed in a voir dire in 
Judge Rokich's court two days prior to the voir dire in Mr. Ewell's 
case. The State7s arguments to the contrary are based on important 
misperceptions of fact and law, which are explained in detail in 
this brief. 
The trial court violated the plain language of the firearm 
enhancement statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CONDUCTED AN ADEQUATE VOIR DIRE 
AND GRANTED THE MISTRIAL MOTION STEMMING FROM 
A JUROR'S PROVISION OF MATERIAL MISINFORMATION 
DURING VOIR DIRE. 
A. Mr. Ewell's Claim of the Overall Inadequacy of the Voir Dire 
Remains Unrebutted. 
The State fails to respond to Mr. Ewell's contention that 
the overall voir dire in this case was inadequate.1 A brief summary 
1. The State argues, 
There is no dispute that a trial court must, 
either by its own examination or by permitting 
counsel to examine the prospective jurors, 
conduct voir dire in such a way that "counsel was 
afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the 
information necessary to evaluate jurors." State 
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988); Utah R. 
Crim P. 18(b). A court must also excuse for 
cause any person who, upon examination, 
demonstrates the disqualifications stated in rule 
18(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State 
v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 280 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant has not presented any specific ways in 
which the trial court neglected these 
obligations. Defendants complaint is that, when 
he discovered that Bogaard had answered a voir 
dire question differently in this case than he 
had in a previous case, the court refused to 
declare a mistrial. 
Brief of appellee at 7. 
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of the contention unrebutted by the State follows. Juror Bogaard, 
the foreman of Mr. Ewell's jury, participated in a voir dire in 
Judge Rokich's court two days before the voir dire in Mr. Ewell's 
case, wherein he expressed a bias against the defendant's right not 
to testify, and wherein he learned that expressing this bias 
disqualifies panelists from serving on juries and may anger trial 
judges.2 Judge Sawaya had apparently learned of the events in the 
Rokich voir dire prior to the voir dire of the panelists in Mr. 
Ewell's case.3 Judge Sawaya conducted the voir dire in a petulant 
(T. 7, 30) and pedantic (T. 11-12, 32) manner which defeated Mr. 
Ewell#s constitutional, statutory and common law rights to have a 
2. The State does not object to this Court's taking 
judicial notice of the voir dire conducted in Judge Rokich's court. 
Brief of appellee at 13. A copy of the Rokich voir dire is in 
Addendum A of appellee's brief. 
3. The State contests Mr. Ewell's assertion that "Judge 
Sawaya 'was apparently aware of the unusual events in the [Judge] 
Rokich voir dire."1 Brief of appellee at 14 n.5. While it is true 
that Judge Sawaya indicated in first denying the motion for a 
mistrial, "I don't know what happened in Judge Rokich's court or 
what attitude Mr. Bogaard may have had at that time," the record 
indicates that the Judge Sawaya was apparently informed prior to 
conducting the voir dire in Mr. Ewell's case concerning the events 
in the Rokich voir dire. When trial counsel indicated his mistake 
in having assumed that none of the Rokich panelists who had 
expressed a bias against the right against self-incrimination would 
be recycled in Mr. Ewell's case, the prosecutor stated, "We 
discussed that very issue in your chambers before we came out and we 
discussed the fact that as part of our jury panel, there were some 
jurors that had been excused by Judge Rokich. We discussed why he 
excused them. In fact, there was some conversation about the 
veracity of that decision so I distinctly remember us all being 
present and having the conversation." (T. 217-218). The trial 
court did not contest the prosecutor's version of events, but ruled 
erroneously that the voir dire he conducted mooted any concerns 
stemming from the Rokich voir dire (T. 218) . 
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voir dire adequate to reveal panelists' biases supporting for-cause 
and peremptory challenges. Not one of the panelists in this case 
ever admitted to one bias during the course of the entire voir dire, 
and the foreman of Mr. Ewell's jury remained silent about his 
concern about a defendant's right not to testify, a bias that he had 
revealed during the Rokich voir dire. Mr. Ewell did not testify. 
Brief of Appellant at 1, 9, 11, 19-21. 
B. Trial Counsel did not Waive the Issue Concerning Juror Bogaard. 
In responding to Mr. Ewell's contention that the trial 
court should have granted his motion for a mistrial when it came to 
light that one of the jurors in Mr. Ewell's case had failed to 
express the bias revealed during the Rokich voir dire, the State 
first argues waiver. In a nutshell, the State's argument is that 
this Court should not address the merits of this issue because 
counsel for Mr. Ewell did not request a remedy less drastic than a 
mistrial. E.g. brief of appellee at 11-12 ("[A] party has an 
obligation to seek to mitigate problems cause by unforeseen 
circumstances by the least onerous method possible. In the present 
case, the least burdensome method would have been to ask the court 
to question Bogaard about the allegedly different answers on 
different days to the same voir dire question."). 
The State's argument overlooks the phalanx of law putting 
the burden on the trial courts to insure the right to a fair and 
impartial jury trial. See e.g. brief of appellant at 9-11. 
The cases the State cites in support of its novel 
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proposition that a defendant must select and request the least 
instrusive remedy in order to preserve an error are not supportive 
and/or inapposite. The first authority the State cites is McDonouqh 
Power v. United States, 464 U.S. 548, 550 n.2 (1984)("It is not 
clear from the opinion of the Court of Appeals whether the 
information stated in Greenwood's affidavit was known to respondents 
or their counsel at the time of the voir dire examination. If it 
were, of course, respondents would be barred from later challenging 
the composition of the jury when they had chosen not to interrogate 
juror Payton further upon receiving an answer which they thought to 
be factually incorrect."). Brief of appellee at 8. By its own 
terms, the Court's statement is dicta which would not be binding on 
any court. More importantly, the dicta is not persuasive authority 
for the State's proposition. In McDonouqh, the attorney for the 
complaining party conducted the voir dire. Id. at 449. Requiring 
the attorney to pursue during voir dire those juror responses that 
the attorney knew at that time to be inaccurate would be natural in 
that context. However, the context and dicta of McDonouqh do 
nothing to support the State's proposition that an attorney who 
learns in the middle of a trial of juror dishonesty during the voir 
dire must move for the re-opening of the voir dire, rather than for 
a mistrial. 
The State's second authority, State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934 
(Utah App. 1990), like McDonouqh, is inapposite because it involved 
a discrepancy concerning juror bias that came to the parties' 
attention during the voir dire. Suarez does nothing to bolster the 
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State's suggestion that a discrepancy concerning juror bias 
discovered in the middle of a trial is waived if a defense attorney 
moves for a mistrial rather than moving the court to re-open voir 
dire. 
State v. DeMillef 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988), the State's 
third authority, stands for the proposition that defendants may not 
submit juror affidavits to impeach a verdict after trial with 
evidence of juror biases, when the potential for those biases was 
clearly foreseeable and the defense attorneys had the opportunity to 
voir dire the jury but did not inquire into the potential biases or 
ask the trial court to do so. DeMille at 83; brief of appellee at 
9-10. According to the record made by trial counsel for Mr. Ewell, 
he mistakenly believed that the panelists who had been dismissed 
from the Rokich voir dire because they had expressed a bias against 
the defendant's right not to testify were not recycled in Mr. 
Ewell's voir dire (T. 217-218). His assumption was reasonable; it 
is difficult to imagine that anyone would attempt to seat a panelist 
in a criminal case when that panelist had expressed a bias against 
the defendant's right not to testify two days before and had 
witnessed the unusual proceedings in Judge Rokich's court. The voir 
dire in Mr. Ewell's case undoubtedly reinforced trial counsel's 
mistaken assumption because when Judge Sawaya asked the panelists if 
any of them had "served as a juror in the trial of a criminal case," 
only one juror responded, indicating that he had served in a case 
twelve years before (T. 16). While the prosecutor disputed trial 
counsel's mistake (T. 218), when the motion for a mistrial was first 
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raised in the middle of trial, the prosecutor indicated that he 
himself did not know which jurors had been on Judge Rokich#s panel 
(T. 175-176). Judge Sawaya did not make any finding that trial 
counsel's mistake was disingenuous. In short, DeMille is inapposite 
to this case because DeMille involved an attorney who failed during 
voir dire and waited until after receiving a guilty verdict to 
inquire into a particular bias that would portend to be present in 
all panelists for the case at issue; whereas in this case, trial 
counsel reasonably but mistakenly believed that there was no concern 
about recycled biased jurors from Judge Rokich's court, and raised 
the issue immediately with the trial court before a verdict when the 
issue came to trial counsel's attention. 
The State's reliance on caselaw governing the criminal 
discovery process, appellee's brief at 10-11, is misplaced. The 
discovery cases cited by the State are both based on Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 16, which sets forth specific remedies for 
discovery violations. E.g. State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 
948 (Utah 1990)("The remedy for violation of this rule is set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16(a)(1982): 'If at any time during the 
course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the 
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not 
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under 
the circumstances.11); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 
1988)("Thus, under the facts of this case, we conclude that 
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defendant waived relief under rule 16(g) as implemented in Knight by 
not making timely efforts to mitigate or eliminate the prejudice 
caused by the prosecutor's conduct."). Discovery violations impact 
on the evidence available for trial. When the evidence available 
changes, there are many remedies available, which are geared toward 
the dynamic nature of the presentation of evidence in a trial, such 
as objecting to the admission of the evidence, moving to strike the 
evidence, requesting curative jury instructions, seeking a 
continuance to facilitate rebuttal of the evidence, moving for a 
mistrial, and seeking dismissal. E.g. State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 
879, 883 (Utah 1988). Hence, in cases involving criminal discovery 
violations, it is incumbent for a defendant to demonstrate 
evidentiary prejudice that was not cultivated by the defense 
attorney's failure to mitigate the prejudice. Id. at 882-883. It 
is important to note that neither Griffiths nor Christofferson holds 
as the State wishes, that defense attorneys must identify and 
request the least onerous remedy. Rather, the cases require 
reasonable and timely efforts to mitigate or eliminate the 
prejudice. See Griffiths, 752 P.2d at 882-883; Christofferson, 793 
P.2d at 948. 
In contrast to the context of discovery violations, when it 
comes to light that there has been a fundamental error in the 
seating of the jury, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 does not 
apply. Once a jury has been selected and a trial has begun, there 
are very few, if any, ways to "mitigate" the damage done by improper 
jury selection. See State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988)(voir 
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dire is designed to be a subtle process, whereby Utah trial courts 
cull from jurors those subconscious biases which might impact on 
their performance). See also State v. Pharris, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 
39, 41 (Utah App. 1993)(fundamental structural errors impacting on 
the right to a fair and impartial jury are traditionally reversed 
without a showing of evidentiary prejudice); Constitution of Utah, 
Article I sections 10 and 12 (guaranteeing right to unanimous 
verdict of eight impartial jurors). 
The State's proposed standard that a defense attorney must 
identify and request the "least onerous method" to remedy an error 
in order to preserve the issue for appeal disregards the fact that 
appellate courts are not to function as H/citadels of 
technicality.'" McDonough Power Equipment v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. at 
553 (citations omitted). Notably, the State itself, even given time 
to write an appellate brief, does not commit to one proper remedy on 
appeal, but argues three remedies (waiver, affirmance on the merits, 
remand) in the alternative. Brief of appellee at 7-16. 
The State's argument that evidence of Mr. Ewell's guilt 
allows the application of its "least onerous remedy" standard, 
appellee's brief at 12 n.4, overlooks the fundamental procedural 
nature of the error in the instant case. As the Court explained in 
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) 
In essence, the right to jury trial 
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial 
by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. 
The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing 
violates even the minimal standards of due 
process. 'A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process.' In the 
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ultimate analysis, only the jury can strip a man 
of his liberty or his life. In the language of 
Lord Coke, a juror must be 'indifferent as he 
stands unsworne.' His verdict must be based upon 
the evidence developed at the trial. This is 
true, regardless of the heinousness of the crime 
charged, the apparent guilt of the offender or 
the station of life which he occupies. ... 
Id. at 471-472 (citations omitted). 
Assuming arguendo that the State's "least onerous remedy" 
standard applies, trial counsel did not waive the issue concerning 
juror Bogaard. The State argues that the least onerous remedy would 
have been to ask the court to re-open the voir dire to determine 
whether Juror Bogaard had been dishonest or had been "rehabilitated" 
by his voir dire experiences under Judges Rokich and Sawaya. Brief 
of appellee at 11-12. Such a request would have been futile. The 
trial court had the opportunity to re-open the voir dire if he had 
seen fit to do so, and was implicitly suggested to do so by the 
prosecutor's argument that the trial court was not in a position to 
make a ruling on the motion for a mistrial on the basis of hearsay 
from trial counsel (T. 175-176). Rather than seeking any 
verification of trial counsel's allegations, the trial court twice 
maintained that his own voir dire successfully mooted any concerns 
about the events in Judge Rokich's voir dire (T. 177; 218). 
Particularly given Juror Bogaard's unique experience in Judge 
Rokich's court (wherein he undoubtedly learned the volatile risks of 
revealing a bias against non-testifying defendants), followed by the 
heavy-handed voir dire in Judge Sawaya's court (wherein Juror 
Bogaard saw Judge Sawaya unexplainably lash out at a different 
prospective juror, and was instructed about the law governing, 
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rather than probed concerning, biases about non-testifying 
defendants), trial counsel selected and requested the appropriate 
remedy in moving for a mistrial. 
As the State admits, brief of appellee at 15 n.7, in State 
v. Suarez, 793 P.2d at 934 (Utah App. 1990), this Court noted that 
when an inference of bias attaches to a potential juror, the burden 
is on the trial court to investigate the bias until it is rebutted. 
Brief of Appellee at 15 n.ll. See also brief of appellant at 18 n. 
2 (citing additional Utah cases to this effect); Frazier v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 497, 513 (1948)(there may be cases wherein jurors 
are so obviously and prejudicially unqualified to serve that trial 
courts have a duty to remove the panelists sua sponte). In the 
instant case, Judge Sawaya should not have recycled the jurors who 
were dismissed for expressing a bias against non-testifying 
defendants in Judge Rokich's voir dire, or should have been very 
thorough in investigating the bias attaching to those jurors. Id. 
Particularly when trial counsel brought the trial court's error to 
his attention, the trial court should have granted the mistrial. 
Contrary to the State's argument, trial counsel for Mr. Ewell never 
asked "the court to limit its consideration to the propriety of 
granting a mistrial." Brief of appellee at 15 n.7. In moving for a 
mistrial, trial counsel brought the error involved in Juror 
Bogaard's service to the attention of the trial court, who then 
neglected his legal duty to cure the error. 
C. Mr. Ewell is Entitled to a New Trial under Suarez. 
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In addressing the merits of the Suarez issue, the State 
argues that Mr. Ewell has not demonstrated that Juror Bogaard 
answered a material voir dire question falsely. The State's 
analysis is tied lock-step to the two-pronged test of McDonouqh; "To 
obtain a new trial, a defendant 'must first answer honestly a 
material question of voir dire, and then further show that a correct 
response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for 
cause.'" Appellee's brief at 12-15, quoting Suarez, 793 P.2d at 
938, quoting McDonouqh, 464 U.S. at 556. The State's strict 
approach is unworkable and unwarranted in light of the McDonouqh 
decision and subsequent caselaw. 
The McDonouqh test is a procedural test based on the 
federal procedural rules and the facts of the McDonouqh case, 
wherein the Supreme Court reversed a circuit court of appeals' 
reversal of a verdict following a three week civil jury trial on the 
basis of vague and disputed allegations concerning a juror's failure 
to disclose a case-related bias, which allegations were not raised 
directly in a motion for a new trial in the district court. 
McDonouqh, 464 U.S. at 551-553 and n.3. 
The McDonouqh test did not command a majority of the 
Court. In concurrence, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens 
and O'Connor, indicated his belief that a juror's honesty during 
voir dire is "in most cases" the best "initial indicator" of whether 
a juror was biased, and added that the McDonough decision did not 
foreclose the traditional remedy for showing a violation of the 
right to an impartial jury — a hearing before the trial court 
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wherein the movant is allowed to prove "actual bias or, in 
exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to 
be inferred." 464 U.S. 556-557. In a separate concurring opinion, 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, also stated a broad 
view of assessing claims of juror impartiality, 
[F]or a court to determine properly whether bias 
exists, it must consider at least two questions: 
are there any facts in the case suggesting that 
bias should be conclusively presumed; and, if 
not, is it more probable than not that the juror 
was actually biased against the litigant. 
Whether the juror answered a particular question 
on voir dire honestly or dishonestly, or whether 
an inaccurate answer was inadvertent or 
intentional, are simply factors to be considered 
in this latter determination of actual bias. 
464 U.S. 558. 
Following the McDonough decision, Utah courts have cited 
the minority's two-pronged test as a helpful guide, but have applied 
the test in a practical manner, tailored the appropriate procedural 
course of Utah cases. In State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989), 
the "[d]efendant [who was charged with rape] sought to introduce 
post-trial evidence that two jurors had failed to disclose during 
voir dire that either they or a close relative had been victims of 
sex-related crimes. He alleged that the other jurors had used this 
nondisclosure as leverage to change the two jurors' votes from 
acquittal to conviction." Jd. at 447. The trial court denied an 
evidentiary hearing, finding that the juror affidavits were barred 
by Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b). Id. On appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court found that the trial court should have admitted the affidavits 
in an evidentiary hearing, and remanded the case for consideration 
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under the McDonough test. Id. at 451. On remand, the trial court 
found that the two jurors in issue did not answer falsely a material 
question of voir dire. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 
1992) . 
On appeal after remand, the justices of the Utah Supreme 
Court issued four opinions concerning how the McDonough test should 
apply to the facts of Thomas. Justice Durham's opinion found that 
the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding that the two jurors 
did not falsely answer a material voir dire question, elaborating on 
the first prong of the McDonough test as follows: 
Some courts have interpreted McDonough to 
require a finding of juror misconduct only if a 
prospective juror is aware that her answers are 
false. We think the better-reasoned approach 
mandates that a juror's "honesty" or "dishonesty" 
be determined by an objective perspective. See 
McDonough, 464 U.S. at 558, (Brennan, J., 
concurring)("One easily can imagine cases in 
which a prospective juror provides what he 
subjectively believes to be an honest answer, yet 
that same answer is objectively incorrect and 
therefore suggests that the individual would be a 
biased juror in the particular case."). The 
emphasis should be on the juror's lack of 
partiality rather than on her intent. 
Thomas, 830 P.2d at 246 (citations omitted). This discussion of the 
first prong of McDonough commanded a majority of the Utah Supreme 
Court. See opinions of Stewart, J., and Zimmerman, J., 830 P.2d at 
249-250. Justice Durham opined that because the jurors' true 
answers would not have supported a challenge for cause, the facts of 
Thomas did not fit neatly within the McDonough framework. She 
opined that the McDonough framework should be modified to allow a 
showing that a correct answer would have supported a challenge for 
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cause, or that a false answer impaired the juror's impartiality. 
Id. at 248. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart agreed with 
Justice Durham's analysis, except for her extension of the second 
prong of the McDonouqh test, and opined that the two jurors had 
incorrectly answered material voir dire questions, which were 
critical to the effective exercise of peremptory challenges. He 
effectively argued that the second prong of McDonouqh should be 
extended to encompass cases wherein correct answers would have been 
critical to the exercise of peremptory challenges. Id. at 250. 
Justice Zimmerman wrote a separate opinion, disagreeing with Justice 
Durham's and Justice Stewart's extensions of the second prong of 
McDonouqh, and opining that both prongs of the original test were 
met in Thomas. Id. at 250. Justice Howe, joined by Chief Justice 
Hall, wrote a dissenting opinion, criticizing Justice Durham's 
extension of McDonouqh, and arguing that the first prong of the 
McDonouqh test was met for only one of the jurors, and that the 
second prong was not met for either juror. Id. at 251. Justice 
Zimmerman's concurring opinion criticized the dissent of Justices 
Howe and Hall for analyzing the second prong of McDonouqh with 
hindsight. Id. at 250. 
While the State quotes Suarez in its brief, the State 
overlooks the fact that Suarez provides yet another example of the 
fact that the application of the minority McDonouqh rule must be 
tailored to the procedural facts of the case. In State v. Suarez, 
793 P.2d 934 (Utah App. 1990), this Court quoted the traditional 
minority McDonouqh rule, 793 P.2d at 938, but tailored the 
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application of the rule to fit the facts of the case. This Court 
found that the second prong of the test was readily met because if 
the recycled juror in that case had revealed the pro-police bias 
that he had revealed in a preceding voir dire in a different case, 
that bias would have justified a for-cause challenge. Suarez at 
938. In addressing the first prong of McDonouqh, this Court stated, 
The first prong of the McDonouqh test 
requires closer study. Defendant asserts that 
juror Wolford failed in the instant case to 
honestly answer the question concerning his 
partiality to police officer testimony. His 
argument is based upon juror Wolford's 
conflicting voir dire responses in the instant 
case and in Judge Russon's court. 
Although the court might have questioned 
juror Wolford about his conflicting response or 
conferred with Judge Russon, it instead passed 
juror Wolford for cause and required defense 
counsel to use a peremptory challenge to have him 
dismissed. On the record before us, however, we 
must conclude that juror Wolford should have been 
excused for cause. 
793 P.2d at 938-939. 
The State's argument intimates that Juror Bogaard did not 
reveal his concern about non-testifying defendants during Judge 
Sawaya's voir dire because his initial statement in Judge Rokich's 
court did not reflect an inability to follow the law, and/or because 
Judge Rokich's voir dire and Judge Sawaya's voir dire taught Juror 
Bogaard that it was the defendants' right not to testify. Brief of 
appellee at 15. Bogaard's statement in Judge Rokich's voir dire 
certainly did reflect an inability to follow the law — it reflected 
that his willingness to afford a defendant the right not to testify 
was contingent on the facts of the case. He stated, "I'm not sure 
if it would sway my opinion one way or another. I would want — 
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depends on the course of the trial, it might sway me. I have no 
opinion one way or another. Depending on what comes out, it might 
have an effect." Brief of Appellee at 13. The overall voir dire in 
the Rokich court and the overall voir dire in the Sawaya court do 
not by speculation erase the bias that he expressed. Given the 
strange manner in which both trial courts conducted voir dire, 
rather than somehow purging Mr. Bogaard of his bias against 
non-testifying criminal defendants, it is likely that the trial 
courts taught Mr. Bogaard that revealing a bias would demonstrate 
his unwillingness to follow the law, and would anger the powerful 
trial judges. 
The Suarez decision demonstrates that because the trial 
court failed to make a tangible record documenting Juror Bogaard's 
impartiality, any speculation as to the inconsistency in the juror's 
performance in the successive jury selections proceedings must be 
resolved in Mr. Ewell's favor. As the Suarez court explained in 
footnote 11, 
Other explanations may exist for the 
discrepancy in [the juror's] voir dire answers 
besides that he told the truth in [the first 
court] and lied to the court in this case. He 
may actually have fabricated in [the first court] 
to avoid jury service, and then, feeling 
remorseful about his dereliction in civic duty, 
answered truthfully in this case. He may have 
answered truthfully in [the first court] and 
then, having reflected on the absurdity of that 
position, undergone an honest change of 
viewpoint. The [argument] submitted by defense 
counsel may not have set forth with precision the 
colloquy in [the first court.] However, these 
possibilities are only speculative since the 
trial court failed to "investigate further until 
the inference of bias was rebutted...." Bailey, 
605 P.2d at 768. 
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D. Remand is Unnecessary, 
The State argues that if this Court does not resolve this 
case on waiver grounds, this Court should remand this case to the 
trial court. The State notes that the Utah Supreme Court remanded 
the Thomas case, and indicates without any explanation, "Such a 
remand may be appropriate here." Brief of Appellee at 16. 
A remand in the instant case would be an unnecessary waste 
of resources. The trial court already had the opportunity to assess 
Juror Bogaard's bias, and ruled that regardless of his performance 
during the Rokich voir dire, Juror Bogaard's performance during the 
Sawaya voir dire demonstrated no bias (T. 177, 218). Assuming that 
the rulings of the trial court are read as factual findings that 
Juror Bogaard was accurate in the Sawaya voir dire because Bogaard 
felt that his previously expressed bias would not effect him in Mr. 
Ewell's case, the findings would be clearly erroneous. Even if 
Juror Bogaard subjectively believed that his bias against 
non-testifying defendants had somehow been erased by the two voir 
dire proceedings, the overall objective facts of this case 
demonstrate a bias that would have supported a challenge for cause. 
See Thomas, 830 P.2d at 246 (requiring an objective approach); brief 
of appellant at 11-21 (detailing objective facts of this case). As 
the majority opinion in Thomas II demonstrates, the juror is not the 
person to evaluate whether a bias will disqualify him from serving 
impartially; it is the trial court's job to assess the impartiality 
of the jurors. See Thomas 830 P.2d at 246-247 (judge, and not juror 
must decide if bias will prevent impartial service). Here, Judge 
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Sawaya did nothing to investigate on the record which jurors had 
participated in the Rokich voir dire, let alone whether they had 
been dismissed for a bias against non-testifying defendants, or 
whether that previously expressed bias would prevent their impartial 
service in this case. Once it became clear that one of the Rokich 
panelists was serving on the jury and had expressed a bias against 
non-testifying defendants, Judge Sawaya did nothing to investigate 
how, if at all, the juror7s bias was no longer a presumptive threat 
to an impartial jury in Mr. Ewell's case. In these circumstances, 
Judge Sawaya failed to sufficiently investigate the presumptive bias 
expressed by Juror Bogaard, and reversal is the appropriate remedy. 
Suarez. 
Additionally, because the overall voir dire conducted by 
Judge Sawaya in this case was inadequate, reversal is the 
appropriate remedy. See point IA of this brief. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED THE FIREARM STATUTE 
IN SENTENCING MR. EWELL. 
The State apparently does not contest the "plain language" 
doctrine of statutory construction. See brief of appellee at 21-22 
(relying on cases based on that doctrine). Unfortunately, the State 
has failed to realize what that doctrine means in this case. The 
essence of the State's argument is that when the Utah State 
Legislature used two separate phrases in the firearm enhancement 
statute, "has been sentenced" and "is convicted," the legislature 
was using two separate phrases to describe one concept — the 
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sentence.4 Brief of appellee at 17-20. In addition to overlooking 
the different grammatical tenses of the two phrases, the State's 
argument overlooks well-established law that when the legislature 
uses separate terms in one statute, the terms are considered to mean 
different things. E.g. Seeber v. Washington State Public Disclosure 
Commission, 634 P.2d 303 (Wash. 1981). See also Madsen v. Borthick, 
769 P.2d 245, 252 n.ll (Utah 1988)(court has "fundamental duty to 
give effect, if possible, to every word of the statute."). 
The State overreaches in arguing that Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22(c) defines the term "judgment of conviction" and that 
this definition should be used to blur the legislature's distinction 
between "is convicted" and "has been sentenced" in the firearm 
statute.5 The rule of criminal procedure is not a statutory 
4. The disputed subsection of Utah Code Ann. section 
76-3-203 states as follows: 
Any person who has been sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment for a felony in which a firearm 
was used or involved in the accomplishment of the 
felony and is convicted of another felony when a 
firearm was used or involved in the 
accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition 
to any other sentence imposed, be sentenced for 
an indeterminate term to be not less than five 
nor more than ten years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently. 
(Emphasis added). 
5. The State argues, 
This [the State's argument] is consistent 
with the term "judgment of conviction" as used in 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 22 
states in part: 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or 
plea of no contest, the court shall 
(footnote continues) 
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definition that is a binding definition for the firearm enhancement 
statute or any other statute. It is a court rule that directs the 
trial courts concerning documentation necessary to the resolution of 
criminal cases. 
While the State is correct in noting that the Tenth Circuit 
appears in the minority in its interpretation of the federal firearm 
statute, brief of appellee at 21-22, the plain language doctrine and 
rule of lenity explained in that case are relevant and fitting in 
this case. The language of the Utah statute is stronger than the 
(footnote 5 continued) 
impose sentence and shall enter a 
judgment of conviction which shall 
include the plea or the verdict, if 
anyf and the sentence. Following 
imposition of sentence, the court 
shall advise the defendant of his 
right to appeal and the time within 
which any appeal shall be filed, 
(emphasis added). Thus, the term "judgment of 
conviction" includes (1) the verdict or plea, and 
(2) the sentence. Additionally, the use of the 
technical meaning if the term is a mandated form 
of statutory construction in Utah Code Ann. § 
68-3-11 (1986). That section states: 
Words and phrases are to be construed 
according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language; but 
technical words and phrases, and such 
others as have acquired a peculiar and 
appropriate meaning in law, or are 
defined by statute, are to be construed 
according to such peculiar and 
appropriate meaning or definition. 
Since the term "judgment of conviction" is 
defined in the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
that definition should carry a presumption of 
being the appropriate meaning in the context of 
criminal procedure law. 
Brief of appellee at 18-19. 
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language of the federal statute in its indication that the 
enhancement in subsection 4 applies only after a felony firearm 
conviction follows a felony firearm sentence.6 
The State's argument that the trial court committed a 
harmless error in imposing the subsection (4) five to ten year 
enhancement on case number 1244, rather than on case number 1243, 
brief of appellee at 19-20, misses the whole point of the extreme 
penalty involved in subsection (4) of section 76-3-203. The 
legislature did not write the statute with the terms "is convicted" 
and "has been sentenced" because it matters upon which of two 
contemporaneous cases the enhancement falls. The legislature used 
the sequential language because it intended for the extreme 
6. Subsection (4) of Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203 states 
as follows: 
Any peirson who has been sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment for a felony in which a firearm 
was used or involved in the accomplishment of the 
felony and is convicted of another felony when a 
firearm was used or involved in the 
accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition 
to any other sentence imposed, be sentenced for 
an indeterminate term to be not less than five 
nor more than ten years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently. 
(Emphasis added). The federal statute, however, provides, 
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of 
violence or drug trafficking crime . . ., uses or 
carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the 
punishment provided for such crime of violence or 
drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to 
imprisonment for five years, . . . . In the case 
of his second or subsequent conviction under this 
subsection, such person shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment for twenty years[.] 
Brief of appellee at 21. 
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penalty involved in subsection (4) to apply only in those cases 
wherein a defendant has been sentenced in a firearm felony case and 
then is convicted of another firearm felony. See Utah Code Ann. 
section 76-1-104 ("The provisions of this code shall be construed in 
accordance with these general purposes. ... (3) Prescribe penalties 
which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which 
permit recognition o[f] differences in rehabilitation possibilities 
among individual offenders."). 
In sentencing Mr. Ewell to an additional firearm 
enhancement under subsection (4) of Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203, 
the trial court violated the rules of statutory construction, which 
are essential to the proper balance of power between the legislative 
and judicial branches of government in this state. See brief of 
appellee at 25. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Ewell's conviction in case 
no. 911901244, and reverse the five year firearm enhancement under 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203(4). 
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APPENDIX 1 
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person «h«n be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. 
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
S e c 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof to testify in his own behal£ to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without; due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without; just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indetenninate term of im-
prisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm 
used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than 
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may 
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less 
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sen-
tence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run con-
secutively and not concurrently; 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed 
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently. 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a 
felony in which a firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment of 
the felony and is convicted of another felony when a firearm was used or 
involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition to any 
other sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not 
less than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not con-
currently. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during 
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission 
of a robbery. 
76-8-1001. Habitual criminal — Determination. 
Any person who lias been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed for 
felony offenses at least one of which offenses having been at least a felony of 
the second degree or a crime which, if committed within this state would have 
been a capital felony, felony of the first degree or felony of second degree, and 
was committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a felony of the 
second degree committed in this state, other than murder in the first or second 
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned in the state 
prison for from five years to life. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appeal: in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 46. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is 
sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or 
sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to 
take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if 
a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, 
the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice hi™ 
Rule 47. Jurors. 
(a) Examination of jurors . The court may permit the parties or their 
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself con-
duct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or 
their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is 
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such addi-
tional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper. 
(b) Alternate jurors . The court may direct that one or two jurors in addi-
tion to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. 
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, 
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or 
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the 
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same 
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the 
same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An 
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after 
the jury retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called 
each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those other-
wise allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against 
an alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall 
not be used against the alternates. 
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made 
to the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual 
juror. Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several 
parties on either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made. 
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A 
challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the 
forms prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the 
intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors 
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be 
noted by the reporter, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the 
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the 
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned. 
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory chal-
lenges. The challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. 
Each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as pro-
vided under Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. 
(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken 
on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a 
person competent as a juror. 
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party, 
or to an officer of a corporation that is a party. 
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward, 
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to 
either party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond 
or obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor 
and creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a 
resident thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license 
fee, or service charge for water power, light or other services rendered to 
. such resident. 
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous 
trial between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then 
a witness therein. 
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the ac-
tion, or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as 
a member or citizen of a municipal corporation. 
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chal-
lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court. The juror challenged, 
and any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such 
challenge. 
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of 
jurors that are to tzy the cause plus such an additional number as will allow 
for all peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sus-
tained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further chal-
lenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When 
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list; of the jurors 
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, 
shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in 
regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be 
necessary to constitute the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, 
and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be adminis-
tered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and 
truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict rendered 
according to the evidence and the instructions of the court. 
(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the impanelling of the 
jury and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his 
duty and there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the 
other jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the 
parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be 
tried with a new jury. 
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury 
to have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place 
in which amy material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a 
body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them 
by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are 
thus absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them 
on any subject connected with the trial. 
(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either dur-
ing the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished 
by the court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury 
they may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be 
kept together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they 
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Unless by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must 
not suffer any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, 
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not, 
before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their 
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may 
take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers 
which have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or 
copies of such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from 
the person having them in possession; and they may also take with them 
notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves 
or any of them, but none taken by any other person. 
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for delib-
eration, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testi-
mony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, 
they may require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being 
brought into court the information required must be given in the presence of, 
or after notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in 
writing or taken down by the reporter. 
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented 
from giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew. 
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed. 
While the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in 
respect to other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with 
the cause submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury dis-
charged. The court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the 
opening of the court, in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment 
for the day. 
(q) Declaration of verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of them, or 
such other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to 
Rule 48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their 
names called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the 
verdict must be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the 
clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either 
party may require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or 
clerk asking each juror if it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling 
there is an insufficient number of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be 
sent out again; otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be dis-
charged from the cause. 
(r) Correction of verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal or insuffi-
cient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury 
may be sent out again. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 18. Selection of jury . 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors •*«* are to 
try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all peremptory 
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror 
shall be called to fill the vacancy before lurcher challenges are made, and any 
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause 
are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remaining, ^M each 
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory 
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until 
all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call 
the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute 
the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose 
nam** are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examina-
tion of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the 
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the 
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit 
to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the 
defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror.'-
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or 
for the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection 
made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material 
departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, 
drawing, summoning and return of the paneL 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is 
sworn and shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall 
specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of the chal-
lenge. 
(Hi) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a 
hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the chal-
lenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be 
called as witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court snail decide the challenge. If the challenge to the 
panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial 
in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall 
direct the selection of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the 
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, 
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evi-
dence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges 
to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall 
be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason 
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory 
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory 
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory 
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the defen-
dants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised sepa-
rately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be 
taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of 
performing the duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person 
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other rela-
tionship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person 
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which rela-
tionship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict 
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be dis-
qualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a 
political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil 
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a 
criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the 
particular offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, 
and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a ver-
dict after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defen-
dant for the act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude 
the juror from voting to impose -the death penalty following conviction 
regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or 
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carry-
ing on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a 
like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant 
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chal-
lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then 
by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before 
peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impanelled. Alternate 
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or 
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution and 
defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alter-
nate juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath and 
enjoy the same privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a privilege of the person 
exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in 
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence 
and the instructions of the court. 
Rule 20. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient 
that a party state his objections to the actions of the court and the reasons 
therefor. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the 
absence of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice him. 
